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• THE HARLEQUINESQUE MOTOROLA DECISION
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
IRVING KOVARSKY*
I. THE Motorola DEersiore
Complainant Leon Myart, a Negro trained to service radio and
television receivers, applied for a semi-skilled job at the Motorola
plant in Chicago.' Motorola refused to employ him because he failed
'a written test administered to him. Mr. Myart then complained to
the Illinois FEP Commission which ordered an investigation. Satis-
fied that Motorola was discriminating, the commission scheduled a
conciliation conference. Motorola refused to participate in the con-
ciliation effort because the commission, at a prior unfair employment
proceeding involving Motorola, would not permit the use of a
stenographer.2 Motorola contended that a stenographic report is de-
sirable to prevent misquoting, and "secret meetings smack slightly of
star chamber proceedings." Since this conciliatory effort failed, a public
hearing became mandatory.' The hearing officer, at the end of this
proceeding, held that Motorola had discriminated against Mr. Myart
and ordered it to hire him.' On review, the Illinois FEP Commission
felt that the evidence supported the charge made that Motorola had
used discriminatory tactics "in the first step of the .. . hiring .. .
process."' The commission, however, overruled the hearing examiner's
order to provide employment and ordered Motorola to pay the com-
plainant $1,000 in damages. On appeal, the Chicago Circuit Court
ruled that the Illinois Commission acted without legislative authority
to award damages but did not disturb the commission finding that
there was discrimination.
Few decisions interpreting state administrative laws forbidding
discriminatory employment have received the popular notoriety and
controversial comment of the Motorola case. Much of the newspaper
criticism, often unfairly arousing public antagonism without consider-
ing all of the facts and issues; has been leveled at the Illinois FEP
Commission.' Questions requiring greater technical competence than
* LL.B., Chicago-Kent College of Law; LL.M., Yale University; M.A. Loyola
University (Chicago); Ph.D., The University of Iowa; Professor of Labor Law, College
of Business Administration, The University of Iowa.
1 Commission Decision on Review, Charge No. 63C-I27, State of Illinois FEPC
(Nov. 18, 1964).
2 Motorola, Inc. v. Illinois FEPC, 58 L.R.R.M. 2573, 2576 (1965).
3 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, § 858(b) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
4 Commission Decision on Review, supra note 1.
5
 Id. at 5.
6 Chicago Tribune, Nov. 21, 1964, p. 14, col. 1; Chicago American, Nov. 23, 1964,
p. 8, col. 1; Chicago Daily News, Nov. 23, 1964, p. 14, cols. 1-2; Chicago Sun-Times,
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normally exhibited by popular commentators—questions surpassing
in importance those doUsed with public comment—have not been
raised. This article is dedicated to a more thorough and technical
review of the many issues fanned by Motorola and to the possible
conflict added by the subsequently enacted Federal Civil Rights Act
of 1964.7
There is a possibility that the complaint in Motorola was
institutionally inspired. The complainant resided in southeast Chicago,
while the Motorola plant was located in a suburb northwest of Chicago.
Since the complainant was not compensated for his hours of travel,
he could well have been a candidate chosen by an organization to
break a real or illusory color barrier. If true, it is unfortunate, for
reasons later disclosed, that the straw man chosen to carry the banner
of equality was not selected more carefully.
II. RELEVANT ILLINOIS LEGISLATION
To understand Motorola and its ramifications, it is necessary to
highlight portions of the Illinois FEP legislation which bear directly
on the decision. The Illinois Legislature, in order to cope with em-
ployment discrimination, enacted legislation' which is, for the most
part, standard, although some provisions are unusual.
After a complaint is lodged with the Illinois Commission, an
investigation follows, and conciliation, if warranted by the evidence,
is undertaken.° Developments at the conciliation meeting are kept
confidential unless the respondent indicates otherwise. The Rules of
Practice promulgated by. the Illinois Commission provide that "its
staff shall not disclose what has occurred in the conference and con-
ciliation meeting unless the respondent requests in writing that such
disclosure be made. No stenographic report or recording shall be taken
at the proceedings during the conciliation conference."' However,
stenographic reporting is permitted during the course of a public
hearing." The rule prohibiting stenographic reporting at the concilia-
tory conference follows prevailing administrative technique; reports
can be pilfered and publicized and the presence of a reporter places a
damper on an otherwise wagging tongue. There is nothing to indicate
that the rule prohibiting the presence of a secretary at the confidential
hearing is unfair.
Nov. 23, 1964 (editorial); Krock, Fair Employment Issue, Decision in Illinois Case
Involving Aptitude Test Raises Questions, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1964, § E, p. 9, col. 1.
7 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964) [hereinafter cited by section only].
	 •
s Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 851-67 (Smith-
Hurd 1961).
9 III. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, § 858 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
10
 Ill. FEPC Rules of Practice II(B)(5), 6 BNA Lab. Policy & Prac., 451:333
(Dec. 15, 1962).
11 Ill. FEPC Rules of Practice III D, id. at 451:335 (Dec. 15, 1962).
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Should the conciliatory effort fail, 12 section 8 of the Illinois act
makes a public hearing mandatory after the respondent is duly notified
of "the charge . . . substantially as alleged in the charge theretofore
filed with the Commission.. .." 13 To this point, the Illinois law is
similar to other state FEPC legislation."
A feature distinguishing the Illinois legislation from most others
is the authority delegated to its commission. Under sections 8(f) and
9(a), the commission is restricted to the gathering of evidence related
exclusively to the complaint made by the aggrieved party; if the
statute is taken at face value, fishing for evidence of other infringe-
ments is prohibited." In other states, the ability of state commissions
to gather evidence is not so restricted; in some states, commissions
can, while investigating a complaint, seek data and order remedies
eliminating violations that are not stated in the complaint. For ex-
ample, the California FEP Commission is empowered to prevent dis-
criminatory employment practices." With such a mandate, that com-
mission can order the discontinuance of a discriminatory test."
Similarly, in Indiana the FEP commission can "initiate and investigate
charges of discriminatory practices"; ' 8 future conduct can be regulated
under the preventative heading of initiation and investigation.
This limiting aspect of the Illinois law appears unwise as well as
unrealistic. Certainly the past practices of a firm are indicative of
present policy and shed light upon the current "sin" and charge. The
Illinois legislation raises the question of whether evidence of past
violation is admissible to establish a current infringement. (This may
to some extent explain the peculiar decision made by the Illinois
Commission in Motorola, later reviewed.) Limiting the gathering of
proof and shackling the commission's ability to introduce evidence of
past practices hampers efficient operation. Furthermore, to best effectu-
12 State commissions optimistically report that most attempts at conciliation are
successful.
13 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, § 858(b) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
14 In contrast, under the Civil Rights Act, the EEOC cannot press for a public
hearing. It is limited to "conference, conciliation, and persuasion." § 706(a). Further,
while Illinois and other state commissions may present testimony and evidence gathered
prior to or during the conciliatory effort when enforcing an administrative decision in
court, the EEOC may not do so. Ibid,
15 Section 8(f) of the Illinois FEP legislation permits the commission "to take such
further affirmative or other action with respect to the complainant as will eliminate .
the effect of the practice originally complained of" while § 9(a) allows the chairman
"to issue subpoenas . . . requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of any evidence which relates to the particular unfair employment practice
charged. ."
10 Cal. Lab. Code § 1421.
17 The authority granted to the commission in California is broad.
15
 Ind. Acts 1961, ch. 208, § 6, at 500. This section was amended in 1963 to read,
"To receive and make preliminary investigation of charges of . ." Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 40-2312(e) (1965).
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ate public policy prohibiting racial discrimination, an attempt to cure
past and prevent future wrong seems to be in order, if only to ease
the burden of future enforcement. Because of this limitation, the
Illinois Legislature has failed to come to grips with the extent of the
problem and the immediate needs of the Negro. 19
III. BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER
Regulations in Illinois require hearing examiners conducting pub-
lic meetings to be licensed attorneys." This follows the philosophy
enunciated by the Illinois Legislature favoring a more formalistic,
legal-like approach to discrimination than is found in other states and
under the federal law. 21 The Illinois Commission appointed a Negro
attorney as examiner," who decided, on February 26, 1964, that
Motorola violated the state law."
The test taken by the complainant was not produced in evidence,
a factor tending to discredit the firm because:
Of the greater number of witnesses testifying in Respondent's
behalf, only witness Hoelscher attempted to place himself
within the area of having direct knowledge of Complainant's
score on test No. 10 .. . . Inasmuch as Mr. Hoelscher was not
the person who administered the test . . . his opportunity for
knowing the fact about which he testified falls short of legal
requirements. [Section 8(e) of the Illinois law requires "the
testimony taken at the hearing shall be subject to the same
rules of evidence which apply in courts of record."] No
testimony was offered from the administrator who adminis-
tered the test and graded it. in the absence of the test which
Complainant took, his answers thereto, and the overlay key
for checking the Complainant's answers, the Hearing Ex-
aminer is denied sufficient means for holding with the Re-
spondent that Complainant was accorded equal opportunity
with all other applicants without regard to the Complainant's
race. Moreover, the complaint alleges that Complainant
passed the company test, the Commission Investigator testi-
fied that when he administered test No. 10 to Complainant
as part of the investigation about two months later, Com-
plainant passed . . . . 24 (Emphasis added.)
19 H.R. Rep. No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1962) ; Negroes in Apprenticeship,
New York State, 83 Monthly Lab. Rev. 952 (1960).
20 Ill. FEPC Rules of Practice VIII A, 6 BNA Lab. Policy & Prac., 451:342 (Dec. 15,
1962).
21 see III. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 851, 867 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
22 Krock, supra note 6.
23 Commission Decision on Review, supra note 1.
24 Decision and Order of Hearing Examiner, Charge No. 63C-127, at 7-8.
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An investigator for the Illinois Commission testified that test No.
10 was subsequently orally administered and passed by the complain-
ant. A queasy feeling immediately engulfs critics concerned with fair
employment; certainly an investigator for an FEP commission is
aware of the need for proof and the desirability of producing the
most substantial evidence. This need is even more important in Illinois
where the commission must follow court-established rules of evidence.'
While Motorola could not claim that discrimination was not practiced
if the written test was produced and successfully completed by Mr.
Myart, it could allege, without fear of substantial contrary proof, that
Mr. Myart did not pass the oral test. Inability to produce a written
test subjects the decision of the hearing examiner to the same "eyebrow
raising" as the failure of Motorola to introduce the initial written test.
In fact, the explanation advanced by Motorola for the destruction of
the test is plausible, whereas the failure of the investigator to admin-
ister a written test has not been explained. Motorola claimed that
written tests are destroyed as soon as the final results are recorded
on an IBM card; since 20,000 tests are given each year, destruction
is a necessity to ease record-keeping. 2 °
Ignoring the question whether the complainant passed the test,
another issue raised is the propriety of testing culturally deprived
people. The hearing examiner felt that the test used in Motorola was
inherently discriminatory; i.e., testing generally, even without intent,
injures the Negro job-seeker. 27 As recognized by the hearing examiner,
controversy abounds on the question of whether tests discriminate
against the underprivileged.' Since the hearing examiner decided
that Mr. Myart• passed the examination, it is unfortunate that the
validity of all testing was made an issue by a comment tantamount to
dictum; unnecessarily stirring a "hornet's nest" is not "good politics"
in the ticklish area of race relations.
Considering the discriminatory nature of testing generally was
unfortunate for another reason, particularly in light of the examiner's
terminology. Certain of its future use, the examiner in Motorola may
have exceeded his authority by banning the Motorola test. As was
noted previously, the Illinois legislation prohibits fishing expeditions
and searches relating to past and future violations." It requires an
examiner to restrict his findings and decision to the complaint at hand;
other violations are not punishable. The examiner's decision could be
25 III. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, 1585(e) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
28 Motorola Co., Motorola FEPC Case (brochure).
27 Decision and Order of Hearing Examiner, supra note 24, at 8.
28 See Allison, Social-Class Influences Upon Learning 2-3, 40-41 (1948) ; Cronbach,
Essentials of Psychological Testing 222 (1949); Thompson & Hughes, Race Individual
and Collective Behavior 223 (1958); Tiffin, industrial Psychology 30, 75 (1943),
29 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
539
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
considered a usurpation of authority, i.e., an attempt to curb future
discrimination.
Cases from other jurisdictions indicate that the failure to test
or hire a Negro passing a test has been taken as evidence of discrimina-
tion. None, however, considered the possibility that testing could be
inherently discriminatory. In a controversy ruled upon by the New
Jersey Commission, it was decided that a failure on the part of the
employer to test two Negroes constituted evidence of discrimination
where the job standard called for testing. 3° The Ohio Civil Rights
Commission reports that a Negro applicant for employment success-
fully completed an aptitude test, but was not hired.' Because the
test was passed and the employer employed few Negroes in a com-
munity where many sought employment, the Ohio law was violated.
Examples of cases where no discrimination has been found include
Cooks v. Carmen's Local' where the Fifth Circuit dealt with a situa-
tion in which promotion was by examination. Because of the shortage
of labor, several Negroes were promoted without an examination.
Later, a simple literacy test was used. According to the court, there
was no evidence of discrimination. Similarly, where a Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory Test was used by an employer to deter-
mine whether a religiously oriented person was psychologically malad-
justed," the New York Commission approved the test because it was
not designed to separate desirable from undesirable applicants seeking
employment but rather to help maladjusted people. The opinion,
however, points to the possibility that the New York Commission
could find some tests inherently discriminatory.
Of course, where the test can be used to help the Negro, there is
no need to raise the question of the possibility of a test tending to
discriminate against a large group of people. Thus a New York court,
under circumstances differing from that reviewed in Motorola, ordered
the application of a test to select the most suitable Negro candidates
for apprenticeship appointments.' Ending the lily-white membership
policy of the Sheet Metal Workers Union, the court said:
The court approaches this matter not simply as litigation
between private parties, but rather views the instant proceed-
ings as raising vital matters filled with greatest public con-
cern. The issue herein, involving the development of non-
discriminatory shop training programs cannot be approached
30 Thompson v. Erie R.R., 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 237 (1956).
1 Third Annual Report of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission at 21-22 (1962).
32 338 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965). See also City of
Pittsburgh v. Plumbers Union, 59 L.R.R.M. 2553 (1965).
33 N.Y. SCAD, 1950 Report of Progress 66-67.
84 Commission For Human Rights, 57 L.R.R.M. 2005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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strictly within the conventional confines of an adversary
proceeding . . . ."
The court stipulated, as part of an ultimate agreement:
Aptitude tests are to be given by the New York City Testing
Center or equivalent testing center. Two hundred per cent of
the number of apprentices ultimately to be appointed who
have achieved the highest rating in an independently con-
ducted aptitude test will be interviewed . . . 8°
The New York court advocated testing as a means of selecting Negroes
exhibiting the most industrial promise. The situation differs from
Motorola because an impartial agency, the New York City Testing
Center, administered the test to select the most promising candidates,
all of whom faced discrimination."
The influence of the hearing examiner's decision upon Congress
can be seen in the Federal Civil Rights Act. Because of the publicity
generated by the testing ban aspect of the Motorola decision, a provi-
sion was added in the federal Iaw which protects from charges of
discrimination employers who require tests." Section 703(h) of the
Civil Rights Act permits the use of the "professionally developed
ability test." The federal law may be fair, particularly in light of the
professional controversy centering about the validity of testing people
who are culturally deprived. But even under this federal law a firm
can be held responsible for knowingly using a professionally developed
test if it is inherently discriminatory.
Another interesting facet of the hearing examiner's decision was
the view that management personnel
have a supreme responsibility to move positively to eradicate
unfair employment practices in every department . . . . The
task is one of adapting procedures within a policy framework
to fit the requirements of finding and employing workers
heretofore deprived because of race, color .. . . The employer
may have to establish in-plant training programs and employ
the heretofore culturally deprived and disadvantaged persons
as learners, placing them under such supervision that will
enable them to achieve job success."
85
 Id. at 2006. This seems to be a more humane approach to the entire problem of
racial discrimination, but would contradict the mandate of the Illinois legislation.
80 Id. at 2010.
87
 The New York court order was issued to correct an imbalance and is, apparently,
contrary to the Federal Civil Rights Act.
88
 The author does not claim that Motorola intended to use the test in a dis-
criminatory manner.
89 Decision and Order of Hearing Examiner, supra note 24, at 10.
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When the Civil Rights Act was deliberated in Congress, however, the
notion was expressed that employment and training priorities for
Negroes was unwarranted and undesirable.° Ignoring the needs of
the Negro, section 703(j) was incorporated into the Civil Rights Act
to protect the employer, employment agency, and union unwilling
to extend immediate help to correct past injustices.' This in theory
was a necessary protection for the white job-seeker. If a white person,
clearly superior to a Negro candidate, seeks promotion or employment,
the employer preferring the white person must be protected. Where
Negro and white applicants are equal or approximately equal in ability,
section 703(j), apparently, protects the employer who prefers &he white
employee. Based upon centuries of slavery and denials of opportunity,
this is an element in the federal law injurious to Negro interests.
IV. THE COMMISSION RULING
Complying with procedure, the decision of the hearing examiner
was reviewed by the Illinois FEP Commission42
 which felt that evi-
dence supported the charge made and the complainant's questionable
background did not alter the firm's discrimination "in the first step
of the . . . hiring process. . . . 7243
The commission, contrary to the hearing examiner, was un-
willing to declare the test inherently discriminatory; the issue, it was
felt, was unimportant because Mr. Myart passed the test. There is,
according to the commission, "the possibility that in a future case .. .
the use of a low level screening test . . . might become a relevant factor
in a Commission determination as to whether or not an unfair employ-
ment practice in violation of this statute was committed."" This
statement, essentially dictum, was unfortunate for two reasons. First,
the federal law protects the use of tests compiled by professionals in
spite of considerable educated feeling that many tests discriminate
against the culturally and economically deprived. Second, does a
finding that a test is discriminatory, in the absence of more conclusive
evidence, satisfy the Illinois mandate requiring the commission to fol-
low legal rules of evidence? In a nutshell, can there be sufficient legal
evidence to support an examiner who finds a test inherently discrimina-
tory? Possible inability to meet the evidentiary requirements could
40 110 Cong. Rec. 12383 (1964) (remarks of Senator Thurmond),
11 Section 703(j) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of ... race, color, religion. • . .
' 42
 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, § 858(g)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
48 Commission Decision on Review, supra note 1, at 5.
44 Id. at 6.
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explain the commission's unwillingness to back completely the hearing
examiner.
A curious turn of events was the commission's claim that it "has
no way to gauge the merit and qualification of the Complainant. The
Commission is unable in this case to apply its general remedial policy
of placing the Complainant in the same position in regard to the Re-
spondent as if no act of discrimination had been committed. . . .""
Why the commission could not "gauge the merit and qualification of
the Complainant" was not shown. Since Mr. Myart was properly
schooled and the commission accepted the finding of the hearing ex-
aminer that the complainant passed the test, evidence was available to
"gauge the merit and qualification of the Complainant." Thus, the com-
mission overruled the hearing examiner's order to provide employment
and ordered the Motorola Company to pay Mr. Myart $1,000 in
damages. If unable to conclude that the complainant was qualified,
how could the commission award $1,000 in damages? In fact, how
could the commission decide that the employer discriminated "in the
first step of the . . . hiring process . . . ."?
What prompted this quixotic opinion is speculative; the possi-
bility that it was prompted by an insufficiency of evidence and the com-
plainant's background has already been advanced. There is news-
paper speculation that the award was deliberately withheld while an
election for state office was underway," suggesting the possibility
that the decision was politically motivated. Another newspaper edi-
torial suggested "that the FEPC tried to avoid offending anyone . . . "47
This "insight" is plausible because the commission refused to order
the hiring of Mr. Myart while permitting a damage award. We live in
a society presently dedicated to the middle road, and the commission
decision smacks of compromise. Certainly members of administrative
agencies reflect thought prevailing within their community and only
with reluctance adopt an extreme position. But the commission, while
deliberating Motorola, should have been aware that their solution was
in many ways more controversial than that of the hearing examiner.
Furthermore, because of the background of Mr. Myart, a decision
completely favoring the company would not lead to adverse criticism
of the commission. Finally, many commissioners accept appointments
as a civic duty and not for political reward: Would commission mem-
bers concern themselves with "throwing a bone" to all of the contes-
tants .under such circumstances?
Other explanations for the position taken by the commission in
Motorola can be conjured up. Mr. Myart, previously convicted of a
46 Id. at 6-7.
46 Chicago Tribune, supra note 6; Krock, supra note 6.
47 Chicago Daily News, supra note 6.
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crime involving moral turpitude, was a candidate for employment whom
many employers would turn down. Employers often refuse to operate
their business in a humanitarian fashion, rightly or wrongly feeling that
financial damage would follow. It is difficult to conclude with convic-
tion that an employer refusing to hire Mr. Myart intended to circum-
vent the law.' However, the commission on review found employer
discrimination. Convinced that the Motorola Company practices dis-
crimination and yet unwilling to order the employment of Mr. Myart,
an award of $1,000 was a convenient compromise.
The Illinois Commission may have been "gunning" for the firm
because of past practices and an interest in preventing future
discrimination. Whether past and future infringements can be punished
by the commission is questionable. As previously indicated, section
8(f) of the Illinois legislation authorizes the commission "to take
such affirmative action ... with respect to the complainant as will
eliminate the effect of the practice originally complained of," while
sections 8(f) and 9(a) prohibit fishing expeditions into the past and
future.4° If the decision was predicated on past unsavory employ-
ment practices which promised to continue, the commission exceeded
authority as spelled out by the Illinois Legislature. But the suggested
motivating force behind the commission's decision, although plausible,
is shadowed by doubt because "a monetary award [was made] in be-
half of the Complainant for the act of discrimination suffered by
him ....750 A commission, it would seem, should be able to look to past
practices, where feasible and necessary, to establish intent in the con-
troversy under consideration.
V. THE CHICAGO TRIAL COURT
On appeal, the Chicago Circuit Court ruled that the Illinois Com-
mission was without legislative authority to award damages, but did
not disturb the commission finding that there was discrimination. The
judge noted that "both sides are guilty of some actions that perhaps
would not be condoned . . . in a courtroom . . . He went on to say:
Arriving at a decision in this case has been particularly
difficult . . . because I am frank to say that had this been a
trial de novo, my judgment . . . might . . . have been different
than that arrived at by the Commission. . . .52
48 Thus, the commission concludes that the discrimination came in the initial phase
of the hiring process.
42 See supra note 15.
58 Commission Decision on Review, supra note 1, at 7.
51 Motorola, Inc. v. Illinois FEPC, supra note 2, at 2574.
52 Ibid.
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It should be noted that the Chicago court, without expressly re-
versing the state commission, actually voided its decision. Since the
commission did not order the firm to hire the complainant, the court,
for all practical purposes, reversed the decision by the commission by
canceling the $1,000 award. Mr. Myart has the "satisfaction" of know-
ing that his complaint was justified, but nothing tangible was granted
as a balm. The commission and court decisions represent a curious
bit of "justice." Is it helpful to be supported morally while denied any
form of legal aid?
VI. THE CONFLICT ADDED BY THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The fair employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act did not
take effect until July 2, 1965; and, consequently, Illinois law was the
exclusive regulator in Motorola. But a future conflict is suggested by
the facts in Motorola which will require adjudication. A savings clause
in the federal law protects state jurisdiction and prevents federal
pre-emption,' but the question raised in Motorola is not fully resolved
by the federal legislation. Section 708 of the Civil Rights Act, osten-
sibly protecting the decision and penalty imposed by the Illinois com-
mission, provides:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve
any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment
provided by any State ... other than any such law which pur-
ports to require or permit the doing of any act which would
be an unlawful employment practice under this title. (Em-
phasis added.)
States in the past have issued orders to rectify racial imbalance,"
58 Section 706(b) states:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a
State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local Iaw prohibit-
ing the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a
State or local authority to grant or seek relief ... or to institute criminal pro-
ceedings . . . no charge may be filed (under federal law) .. . by the person
aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been com-
menced under the State or local law...
Sec. 706(c) further provides:
In the case of any charge filed by a member of the Commission alleging an
unlawful employment practice occurring in a State or political subdivision of a
State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the practice alleged and estab-
lishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such
practice or to institute criminal proceedings ... the Ifederal] Commission shall,
before taking any action ... notify the appropriate State or local officials and,
upon request, afford them a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days ... to
act under such State or local law. . . .
54 Thompson v. Erie R.R., supra note 30.
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and Motorola can be read as an attempt to correct past imbalance
and/or penalize the employer.
Section 708 permits state commissions to punish violators of a
state law, without any question of federal intervention. But Section
703(j) of the Civil Rights Act protects employers unwilling to correct
existing imbalances "in any community, State, section, or other area,
or in the available work force in any community, State, section or
Other area." Succinctly, section 703(j) does not necessitate the immedi-
ate correction of employment imbalance, while section 708 safeguards,
without exception, the penalty imposed by a state commission. Should
section 703(j) and 708 be read together so that a state commission
making a decision in a controversy affecting interstate commerce can-
not require the correction of an existing imbalance? An affirmative
answer is possible because the language in section 708 is unequivocal:
"Nothing shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment. . . ." inflicted by a state com-
mission. (Emphasis added.)
Executive Order No. 10925 further complicates the problem posed.
This order requires an employer holding a government contract to
take, positive and remedial action to correct racial imbalance in employ-
ment." Although Executive Order No. 10925 does not push a benign
quota system," employers must recognize past injustices and support
the Negro by providing job opportunities. The Motorola Company
holds contracts with the federal government and must abide by the
order. Mr. Myart complained to the President's Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity," which is charged with the task of enforcing
the order. The problem raised is whether Executive Order No. 10925
conflicts with the Civil Rights Act, which does not require preferential
treatment for the Negro. In fact, if an employer was to grant preferen-
tial treatment to a Negro, following the spirit of Executive Order No.
10925, he runs the risk of being charged with discrimination by a
white person under the Civil Rights Act. The question posed is not one
of pre-emption, because two branches of the federal government claim
jurisdiction; the issue is whether an order by the executive branch of
the government, contrary to congressional expression, can override
controlling legislation. Because the executive branch of government
lets contracts, can conditions be imposed that are not demanded by
Congress?
55 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
55 There seems to be little question that favoring the Negro over the white by using
a quota system is unconstitutional.
57 A letter from the Director of Information for The President's Committee On
Equal Employment 'Opportunity, January 27, 1965, indicates that the Air Force is
currently investigating the charge made by Mr. Myart.
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Perkins v. Lukens58
 may supply the answer. In Lukens, the Su-
preme Court supported the Secretary of Labor when she laid down
conditions, possibly conflicting with federal legislation, imposing con-
tractual terms on private employers. Even if Executive Order No.
10925 contradicts rather than supports legislative policy expressed in
the Civil Rights Act, Lukens lends support to the notion that the execu-
tive branch of government can dictate terms when letting a contract."
It is possible to interpret section 703 (j) in a manner to avoid
conflict between the federal law and Executive Order No. 10925. Sec-
tion 703 (j) protects the employer unwilling to grant preferential treat-
ment to the Negro because of past deprivation. Thus, an employer
who negotiates a contract with a federal agency acts voluntarily—he
is not required to agree to terms. Certainly employers have not looked
upon repugnant terms demanded by other private employers as legally
coercive. Yet in light of current conditions, where the federal govern-
ment sponsors research and negotiates large contracts, it seems naïve
to treat Uncle Sam in the same manner as an ordinary contracting
party. To foreclose the possibility of entering into contracts with the
federal government is to choke off a large source of business. Under
conditions of great economic pressure, is a contract entered into volun-
tarily? Should a government contract be treated differently than an
agreement made by a private party?
58 310,13.S. 113 (1940).
59 Id. at 127.
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